June 18, 2003
Dear Concerned Citizen,

So far in Iraq, there are few signs of Saddam Hussein and there are few signs of his weapons of mass destruction, the so called WMDs. Since President Bush cited, as his rationale for the invasion of Iraq, Hussein’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, the failure of the Americans to find such weapons has become a political problem.

Leading Democrats like Senator Carl Levin of Michigan and Senator Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia have called Senate hearings to investigate why no chemical, biological or nuclear weapons facilities have turned up in Iraq. Senator Levin has said that “the credibility of the nation, and of the Bush administration, is on the line.”

Senior Bush administration officials seem determined to find the weapons. Secretary of State Colin Powell has expressed confidence that “more evidence and more proof will come forward” as the search continues, a claim echoed by the president. Asked if the failure to find WMDs proves that no such weapons existed in Iraq, Defense Secretary Don Rumsfield wryly observed that “we haven’t found Saddam Hussein, and as far as I know there is no one who claims that he didn’t exist.”

Certainly Hussein and his men, knowing that an American attack was coming, can be expected to have carefully concealed their WMDs. Perhaps they will turn up, as the Bush team expects and hopes. But perhaps they won’t. What then?

If there are no WMDs, clearly there was a failure of intelligence, or of information processing, in the CIA and the White House. After all, the Bush administration seemed completely assured that such weapons did exist. This internal breakdown will have to be corrected. But the strange thing is that throughout the period leading up to the war, the Hussein regime acted like it did have facilities for WMDs. If not, Hussein could easily have said to the U.S. and the United Nations, ‘Send all the inspectors you want. I don’t have the weapons, and you aren’t going to find anything.” In other words, if Hussein had nothing to hide, he could have remained in power.

Hussein’s behavior suggests a more common-sense interpretation: Saddam Hussein was pursuing WMDs, whether or not he had actually developed them. Both Iraqi scientists and United Nations inspectors have amply testified to Hussein’s goals and efforts. Moreover, allied forces did find two truck trailers which were probably part of a mobile biological weapons facility. Hussein’s possession of nerve gas and other biological agents is not in doubt: he has used such weapons against the Kurds.

Another point to remember is that Hussein’s possession of WMDs was never the sole rationale for the war. Rather, there were from the outset three reasons for the coalition action that deposed the regime: its links with al Qaeda and with terrorism, its brutality against its own people, and its aspiration to develop WMDs.

Even if Iraq wasn’t directly behind the 9-11 attacks, the ties between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda cannot be doubted—Colin Powell spelled them out in his testimony before the United Nations. Moreover, is there any remaining uncertainty about how viciously the Hussein regime tyrannized over the people of Iraq? The mass graves, the heart-rending testimony of Iraqis, the joyous welcome given to coalition troops, all testify to how badly Iraqis suffered under Hussein, and how much better their prospects are now.

Throughout the Iraq campaign, critics of the Bush administration have insisted that the U.S. invasion was all about oil and self-interest, and had nothing to do with the welfare of the Iraqis. Ironically if the Bush administration doesn’t find those WMDs, the main result of this expensive war may turn out to be less important from the point of view of America’s self-interest, and more important from the point of view of giving the Iraqi people a better life.