October 30, 2003
Dear Concerned Citizen,

My article on “brights,” first published in tothesource, and subsequently published in a slightly different form in the Wall Street Journal, drew a large and passionate response. Some of the letters and emails were from religious believers, but the majority came from committed atheists and agnostics. Some of the “brights” who wrote were respectful and courteous; many displayed precisely the dogmatism and arrogance that my article noted. Putting on their best thinking hats, the unbelievers sought to point out fallacies in my article. Certain common themes emerged from these criticisms.

First, many critics accused me (and by implication Kant) of saying that reason and science are not reliable forms of knowledge. One critic cited the libertarian thinker Ayn Rand’s attack on Kant, in which Rand faulted Kant for saying that man has eyes but cannot see, man has ears but cannot hear—in short, that man’s senses are fundamentally deluded.

But Kant’s point is not that our senses are unreliable. True, our senses can fool us, as when we see a straight twig as bent because it is partly submerged in water, or when we are dreaming but think we are awake. Human beings have found ways to correct these sensory distortions. Kant is quite aware of this.

His argument is that even our reliable perceptions are only “representations” or “perspectives” of reality; they are not reality itself. Consider this: I see a dog. I experience a dog through my sight, hearing, smell, etc. But do I have the slightest idea of what it means to be a dog? All I have, as it were, is “outside” rather than “inside” information. Kant is making the obvious point that all that we know about reality comes to us through the refracted filter of our experience.

Reason is also limited, according to Kant, in a deeper sense. Kant suggests that just as a tape recorder can only capture sound, but not smell or taste or touch, so too our five senses can only apprehend that aspect of reality which is accessible to them. What we experience, in other words, is necessarily and permanently conditioned by the equipment we possess. None of the “brights” had an answer to this.

Several of the “brights” emphasized, however, that whatever the limits of reason, history shows that man can learn from his mistakes. In other words, reason has the capacity for criticism, correction, and growth. One writer noted that “human technology has vastly extended” the reality we perceive, and this can be expected to continue. Other critics reminded me that reason may be a flawed instrument, but it is the only form of knowledge that we can depend on.

Here is what Kant would say to all this. It is a mistake to believe that if reason can’t figure something out today, then more reason could well figure it out tomorrow. Yes, that is true in certain important matters, like finding new stars or new medical treatments. But it is not true in other important matters, for how can reason correct something that is not in its domain?

Can reason say whether there is an eternal being—a being outside of time—that is the necessary ground for all temporal existence? Kant would say that reason can never answer such a question because time isn’t something “out there.” It is a mode of human perception. As humans, we are incapable of perceiving anything outside of space and time. Space and time are, if you will, part of the furniture of our minds. No technology can change this—technology can only alter what we perceive and experience within space and time.

Finally some critics say in exasperation, “Maybe we don’t know what lies beyond experience, but why should we rely on blind faith?” Kant points out the flaw in this mode of reasoning: it dogmatically presumes that reason is the only legitimate mode of knowledge. But in fact there are other ways of knowing, such as love, intuition, tradition, and yes, faith.

Where reason is inoperative, Kant argues, there is nothing wrong with using faith, just as there is nothing wrong with deciding whether I love someone by consulting my feelings. Certainly it would be stupid—not wise—to examine the issue of love solely with reference to reason, or to deny the existence of love because it is not comprehensible in terms of reason. Our self-proclaimed “brights,” who refuse to consider the question of God except within the limits of their reason, have succumbed to the same error of judgment.